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Abstract
Virtually every connection to an Internet service is preceded
by a DNS lookup. These lookups are performed in the clear
without integrity protection, enabling manipulation, redirection,
surveillance, and censorship. In parallel with standardization
efforts that address these issues, large providers such as Google
and Cloudflare are deploying solutions to encrypt lookups, such
as DNS-over-TLS (DoT) and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH). In this
paper we examine whether encrypting DoH traffic can protect
users from traffic analysis-based monitoring and censoring. We
find that performing traffic analysis on DoH traces requires
different features than those used to attack HTTPS or Tor traffic.
We propose a new feature set tailored to the characteristics of
DoH traffic. Our classifiers obtain an F1-score of 0.9 and 0.7
in closed and open world settings, respectively. We show that
although factors such as location, resolver, platform, or client
affect performance, they are far from completely deterring the
attacks. We then study deployed countermeasures and show
that, in contrast with web traffic, Tor effectively protects users.
Specified defenses, however, still preserve patterns and leave
some webs unprotected. Finally, we show that web censorship
is still possible by analysing DoH traffic and discuss how to
selectively block content with low collateral damage.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical subsystem of
the Internet infrastructure, on which most Internet-applications
depend. Only in the first quarter of 2019, more than 5 trillion
DNS messages were exchanged per month [1]. The vast ma-
jority of such messages are sent in the clear [2], exposing the
destination of communications to a number of entities: Inter-
net Service Providers (ISPs), Autonomous Systems (ASes), or
state-level agencies, can monitor users’ activities [3], hence
enabling mass surveillance [4], and easing network censorship
by filtering and redirecting DNS traffic [5, 6].
The lack of mechanisms to enhance DNS privacy raise serious
concerns among advocates [7] and Internet governance and
standardization bodies [8]. Among the solutions that have
been proposed to prevent the inspection of domain names,
two protocols have been standardized and deployed: DNS-
over-TLS (DoT) [9] and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [10]. These
protocols protect the communication between the client and
the recursive resolver. More specifically, DoH uses HTTP/2
over TLS, and thus, is well suited for encrypting browsing-
related DNS lookups [11]. Companies such as Google and
Cloudflare have launched public DoH resolvers [12, 13], and
Mozilla recently added DoH support to Firefox [14].
Under the assumption that encryption is enough to provide
lookup confidentiality, existing evaluations of DoH imple-
mentations have focused on understanding the impact of
the underlying transport protocol and encryption on perfor-
mance [15, 16]. Yet, it is known that traffic features such as
volume and timing can reveal the destination of the communi-
cation [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
In this paper we perform, to the best of our knowledge, the
first traffic analysis study of encrypted DNS from a security
and privacy angle. We consider an adversary placed between
the client and the DNS resolver that aims at identifying which
web page is visited by users, to either perform surveillance on
users’ traffic or censor access to certain resources. We focus
on the case of DoH, as its adoption by large industry actors
makes it prevalent in the wild.
The particularities of DNS traffic make it resistant to tradi-
tional traffic analysis techniques [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. We
identify a novel set of features based on n-grams that capture
local characteristics of traces that enable successful traffic anal-
ysis for encrypted DNS. We show how this set of features is
robust to changes in the environment (e.g., end-user location
or evolution of pages over time) or in the client’s configura-
tion (e.g., choice of client application, platform or recursive
DNS resolver) Furthermore, we find that our new feature set
provides comparable or better results than the state-of-the-art
in website fingerprinting.
Motivated by our exchange with Cloudflare after responsible
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
09
68
2v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
5 J
un
 20
19
disclosure, we evaluate existing traffic analysis defenses: the
standardized EDNS0 padding [23] and the use of Tor [24]. We
find that in our setup, contrary to what was suggested by Cloud-
flare engineers, EDNS padding strategies cannot completely
deter our attack. Also, as opposed to traditional web traffic
fingerprinting in which Tor offers little protection against traf-
fic analysis, in the case of DoH, Tor is an extremely effective
defense.
Finally, we measure the potential of encryption to hin-
der current DNS-based censorship practices. Using a novel
information-theoretic model we show that, given that the size of
the domain names associated with the resources embedded in a
webpage visit (e.g., third-party services, or content-providers)
are the primary source of information in DoH traffic, this in-
formation can be used by censors to maintain their practices
without much impact on other traffic.
To summarize, our main contributions are as follows:
• We conduct the first study of the vulnerability of DoH traffic
to traffic analysis attacks. We show that traditional web
fingerprinting techniques do not work on DoH and propose a
new feature set to capture local characteristics (Section 5.1).
• We show that traffic analysis is effective against DoH,
achieving the same accuracy as regular web fingerprint-
ing while requiring 5x less volume of data. We show that
factors such as end-user location, choice of recursive DNS
resolver, client-side application, or platform affect, but do
not stop, the attacks (Section 5).
• We evaluate existing traffic analysis countermeasures and
show that only Tor can fully protect DoH traces (Section 6).
• We propose an information-theoretic model to evaluate the
feasibility of DNS-based censorship when DNS lookups are
encrypted (Section 7).
• We gather the first dataset of encrypted DNS traffic collected
in a wide range of environments (Section 4).1
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide background on the Domain Name
System (DNS) and existing work on DNS privacy.
The Domain Name System (DNS) is primarily used for trans-
lating easy-to-read domain names to numerical IP addresses 2.
This translation is known as domain resolution. In order to
resolve a domain, a client sends a DNS query to a recursive
resolver, a server typically provided by the ISP with resolving
and caching capabilities. If the domain resolution by a client is
not cached by the recursive name server, it contacts a number of
authoritative name servers which hold a distributed database of
domain names to IP mappings. The recursive resolver traverses
1Our dataset and code will be made public upon acceptance.
2Over time, other applications have been built on top of DNS [25, 26]
the hierarchy of authoritative name servers until it obtains an
answer for the query, and sends it back to the client. The client
can use the resolved IP address to connect to the destination
host. Figure 1 summarizes this process.
Enhancing DNS Privacy. As with other network protocols,
security was not a major consideration in the first versions
of DNS, and thus DNS traffic has been sent in the clear over
(in some cases, untrusted) networks. Over the last few years,
security and privacy concerns have fostered the appearance of
solutions aiming to make DNS traffic resistant to eavesdrop-
ping and tampering.
Early efforts for enhancing DNS security include protocols
such as DNSSEC [27] and DNSCrypt [28]. DNSSEC intro-
duces digital signatures to prevent manipulation of DNS data.
It does not, however, provide confidentiality. DNSCrypt, first
deployed by OpenDNS, both encrypts and authenticates DNS
traffic between the client and the recursive resolver. However,
it was never proposed to the IETF for standardization so it did
not achieve wide adoption.
The IETF approved DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [9] and DNS-over-
HTTPS (DoH) [10] as Standards Track protocols in 2016 and
2018, respectively. In DoT, a DNS client establishes a TLS
session with a recursive resolver (usually on port TCP:853 [9]
as standardized by IANA) and exchanges DNS queries and
responses over the encrypted connection. To amortize costs, the
TLS session between the client and the recursive DNS resolver
is usually kept alive and reused for multiple queries.
In DoH, the local DNS resolver establishes an HTTPS connec-
tion to the recursive resolver and encodes the DNS queries as
HTTP requests. DoH considers the use of HTTP/2’s Server
Push mechanism. This enables the server to preemptively push
DNS responses to clients that are likely to follow a DNS
lookup [29], thus reducing communication latency. As op-
posed to DoT, which uses a dedicated TCP port for DNS traffic
and thus it is easy to monitor and block, DoH lookups can be
sent along non-DNS traffic using existing HTTPS connections
(yet potentially blockable at the IP level). However, DoT may
be more convenient for enterprise network administrators, as it
allows keeping tighter control over the DNS traffic.
There are several available implementations of DoT and DoH.
Cloudflare and Quad9 provide both DoH and DoT resolvers,
Google supports DoH, and Android P (currently in beta ver-
sion) has native support for both DoH and DoT. DoH enjoys
widespread support from browser vendors. Firefox provides
the option of directing DNS traffic to a trusted recursive re-
solver such as a DoH resolver, falling back to plaintext DNS
if the resolution over DoH fails. Cloudflare also distributes
a stand-alone DoH client and, in 2018, they released a hid-
den resolver that provides DNS over Tor, not only protecting
lookups from eavesdroppers but also providing anonymity for
clients towards the resolver. Other protocols, such as DNS-
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Figure 1: DNS resolution: To visit www.google.com, a user
queries the recursive resolver for its IP. If the record is not
cached, the recursive resolver queries an authoritative resolver
and forwards the response to the client. The client uses the IP
in the response to connect to the server via HTTP. We consider
an adversary placed between the client and the resolver (i.e.,
observes the red dotted lines).
over-DTLS [30], an Experimental RFC proposed by Cisco in
2017, and DNS-over-QUIC [31], proposed to the IETF in 2017
by industry actors, are not widely deployed so far.
Several academic works study privacy issues related to DNS.
Shulman suggests that encryption alone may not be sufficient
to protect users [32]. Our results confirm her hypothesis that
DNS response size variations can be a distinguishing feature.
Herrmann et al. study the potential of DNS traces as identifiers
to perform user tracking but do not consider encryption [33].
Finally, Imana et al. study privacy leaks on traffic between
recursive and authoritative resolvers [34]. This is not protected
by DoH and it is out of scope of our study.
3 Problem Statement
In this paper, we set to answer the question: is it possible to
infer which websites a user visits from observing encrypted
DNS traffic? This information is of interest to multiple actors,
e.g., entities computing statistics on Internet usage [35, 36],
entities looking to identify malicious activities [6, 37, 38],
entities performing surveillance [3, 39], or entities performing
censorship [40, 41].
We consider an adversary that can collect traffic between the
user and the DNS recursive resolver (red dotted lines in Fig-
ure 1), and thus can link lookups to a specific origin IP address.
Such an adversary could be present on the users’ local network,
near the resolver, or anywhere along the path (e.g., an ISP or
compromised network router).
Depending on her location, the adversary may or may not ob-
serve the subsequent HTTP connection to the destination host.
For instance, an adversary could be located in an AS that lies
between the user and the resolver —e.g., when using third-
party DNS resolvers like Quad9 rather than their ISP-provided
one—, but not between the user and the destination host. We
performed measurements from our university network to ver-
ify that this is the case in a non-negligible number of cases.
Furthermore, BGP hijacking attacks, which are becoming in-
creasingly frequent [42], can be used to selectively intercept
paths to DoH resolvers. In such cases, the adversary can only
rely on DNS fingerprinting to learn which webpages are visited
by a concrete user for monitoring, or censorship [3, 39].
In the case of an adversary that also has access to the HTTP
connection, one could argue that the subsequent HTTP(S) con-
nection reveals visited domains even when encrypted. Fields
such as the destination IP or the Server Name Indicator (SNI)
may reveal the visited domain to the adversary in the case of
TLS traffic. That could be further aggravated by HTTP flows
emanating without encryption from the same user machine [4].
However, with the increasing prevalence of virtual hosting and
Content Delivery Networks, and the implementation of pro-
tocols such as IPv6 and TLS 1.3, determining the destination
domain of the connection without traffic analysis becomes
more difficult. Thus, data leaked by encrypted DNS becomes
even more relevant. While the adversary could perform tradi-
tional website fingerprinting, we show that fingerprinting DoH
achieves the same accuracy while requiring less volume of
data: our DoH traces are in average 5 times shorter in number
of packets than HTTPS traces for web traffic.
We assume that the adversary has access to encrypted DNS
traffic traces that are generated when the user visits a website
via HTTP/S using DoH to resolve the IPs of the resources.
A DNS trace, which we also call DoH trace, comprises the
resolution of the visited website first-party domain, and the
subsequent resolutions for the resources contained in the web-
site, e.g., images, or scripts. For instance, for visiting Red-
dit, after resolving www.reddit.com, the client would resolve
domains such as cdn.taboola.com, doubleclick.net and
thumbs.redditmedia.com, among others.
We consider two different adversaries depending on their goals:
first, monitoring the browsing behavior of users, which we
study in Section 5; and second censoring what pages users
visit, which we study in Section 7. We note that there is a very
important difference between these two goals regarding data
collection. Monitoring does not require the adversary to take
any action based on her observations. Thus, she can collect
full traces to make their inferences as accurate as possible. In
contrast, censorship adversaries need to find out which domain
is being requested as fast as possible so as to interrupt the
communication, so they must act on partial traces.
3
Table 1: Overview of datasets.
Name Identifier # webpages # samples
Desktop (Location 1) LOC1 1,500 200
Desktop (Location 2) LOC2 1,500 60
Desktop (Location 3) LOC3 1,500 60
Raspberry Pi RPI 700 60
Firefox with Google resolver GOOGLE 700 60
Firefox with Cloudflare resolver CLOUD 700 60
Firefox with Cloudflare client CL-FF 700 60
Open World OW 5,000 3
DoH and web traffic WEB 700 60
DNS over Tor TOR 700 60
Cloudflare’s EDNS0 padding implementation EDNS0-128 700 60
Recommended EDNS0 padding EDNS0-468 700 60
4 Data Collection
We collect traces for the top, middle, and bottom 500 webpages
in Alexa’s top million websites list on 26 March 2018 (1,500
webpages in total). We visit each webpage in a round-robin
fashion, obtaining up to 200 samples for every webpage. For
our open world analysis, we collect traces of an additional
5,000 webpages from the top domains of the Alexa list. We
collected data during two periods, from 26 August 2018 to 9
November 2018, and from 20 April 2019 to 14 May 2019. Data
from these two periods is never mixed in the analysis
To collect the traces we set up Ubuntu 16.04 virtual machines
with DoH clients that send DNS queries to a public DoH re-
solver. We use Selenium3 (version 3.14.1) to automatically
launch a full-fledged browser and visit a webpage from our
list and trigger the DNS lookups. We repeat this process for
every webpage in the list restarting the browser every time to
ensure that the cache and profile do not affect collection. We
run tcpdump to capture the network traffic between the DoH
client and the resolver. We filter the traffic by destination port
and IP to obtain the final DoH trace.
To study the influence of various parameters on DoH traffic,
we collect data in different scenarios varying end user loca-
tion and platform, DoH client and resolver, and different DNS
traffic analysis defenses. Table 1 provides an overview of the
collected datasets. To better understand the vulnerabilities of
DNS encryption we opted for having heterogenous experi-
ments rather than in-depth studies of few cases, resulting in
the difference in samples among the datasets. In the following
sections, we use the Identifier provided in the second column
to refer to each of the datasets. Note that unless specified oth-
erwise, we use Cloudflare’s DoH client.
Data curation. We curate the datasets to ensure that our re-
sults are not biased by spurious errors in collection, or website
behaviors that are bound to generate classification errors unre-
lated to the characteristics of DNS traffic with respect to traffic
analysis attacks.
3https://www.seleniumhq.org/
Concretely, we aim at identifying two cases. First, the cases in
which different domains generating the same exact DNS traces.
These occur when webpages redirect to other pages or to the
same resource, and when web servers return the same errors
(e.g., 404 not found or 403 forbidden). Second, the case in
which websites change during collection for reasons other than
those variations due to their organic evolution. For instance,
pages that go down during the collection period. When this
happens, the captured traces do not represent the expected
behavior of the page.
To identify these cases, we use the Chrome over Selenium
crawler to collect the HTTP request/responses, not the DNS
queries responses, of all the pages in our list in LOC1. Then
we conduct two checks. First, we look at the HTTP response
status of the top level domain, i.e., the URL that is being re-
quested by the client. We identify the webpages that do not
have an HTTP OK status. These could be caused by a number
of factors, such as pages not found (404), anti-bot solutions, for-
bidden responses due to geoblocking [43] (403), internal server
errors (500), and so on. We mark these domains as conflicting.
Second, we confirm that the top level domain is present in the
list of requests and responses. This ensures that the page the
client is requesting is not redirecting the browser to other URLs.
This check triggers some false alarms. For example, a web-
page might redirect to a country-specific version (indeed.com
redirecting to indeed.fr, results in indeed.com not being
present in the list of requests); or in domain redirections
(amazonaws.com redirecting to aws.amazon.com). We do not
consider these cases as anomalies. Other cases are full redirec-
tions. Examples are malware that redirect browser requests to
google.com, webpages that redirect to GDPR country restric-
tion notices, or webpages that redirect to domains that specify
that the site is closed. We consider these cases as invalid web-
pages and add them to our list of conflicting domains.
We repeat these checks multiple times over our collection pe-
riod. We find that 70 webpages that had invalid statuses at some
point during our crawl, and 16 that showed some fluctuation in
their status (from conflicting to non-conflicting or vice versa).
We study the effects of keeping and removing these conflicting
webpages in Section 5.2.
5 Website Fingerprinting through DNS
Website fingerprinting attacks enable a local eavesdropper to
determine which pages a user is accessing over an encrypted
or/and anonyimized channel. Website fingerprinting has been
shown to be effective on HTTPS [17, 18, 44], OpenSSH tun-
nels [45, 46], encrypted web proxies [47, 48] and VPNs [49],
and even on anonymous communications systems such as
Tor [19, 20, 21, 22, 50, 51, 52, 53].
Website fingerprinting exploits the fact that the size, timing,
and order of TLS packets are a reflection of a website’s content.
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As resources are unique to each webpage, the traces identify
the web. These patterns can be indirectly observed, even if the
traffic has been encrypted or anonymized.
Some of the patterns exploited by website fingerprinting are
correlated with patterns in DNS traffic. For instance, which
resources are loaded and their order, determines the order of
the corresponding DNS queries. Thus, it is likely that website
fingerprinting can also be done on DNS traffic encrypted with
protocols such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH). In this paper we
call DNS fingerprinting the use of traffic analysis to identify the
web page that generated a trace of encrypted DNS traffic, i.e.,
website fingerprinting on encrypted DNS traffic. In the follow-
ing, whenever we do not explicitly specify whether the target
of website fingerprinting is DNS or HTTPS traffic, we refer to
traditional website fingerprinting on HTTPS traffic.
5.1 DNS traffic fingerprinting
As in website fingerprinting, we treat DNS fingerprinting as
a supervised learning problem: the adversary first collects a
training dataset of network traces for a set of pages, where
the page (label) corresponding to a network trace is known.
The adversary extracts features from the network traces (e.g.,
lengths of network packets) and trains a classifier to identify the
page given a network trace. To deploy the attack, the adversary
collects traffic from a target user and feeds it to the classifier
to determine which page generated that traffic.
Traffic variability. In website fingerprinting, conditions such
as networks conditions and embedded third-party advertise-
ments, introduce variance in traffic traces sampled for the same
website. Similarly, DNS traces also vary over time. Thus, the
adversary must collect multiple samples for each page in order
to obtain a robust representation of the page.
Some of this variability has similar origin to that of web traffic.
For instance, the dynamic nature of websites that results on
varying the DNS lookups associated with third-party embedded
resources; the platform where the client runs, the configuration
of the DoH client, or the software using the client which may
vary the DNS requests (e.g., mobile versions of websites, or
browsers’ use of pre-fetching); or the effects of content local-
ization and personalization, which determines which resources
are served depending on the location of the user, or her actions
(e.g., logged in or not).
Additionally, there are some factors specific to DNS traffic.
Concretely, the effect of the local resolver, which depending
on the state of the cache may or may not launch requests to
the authoritative server, resulting in different traffic patterns; or
the DNS-level load-balancing (e.g., CDNs) which may provide
different IPs for a resource [54].
Feature engineering.
DNS traffic presents unique challenges with respect to web
traffic for fingerprinting. Besides the extra traffic variability,
DNS responses are smaller than web resources. In most cases,
DNS requests and responses fit in one single TLS record, even
if they are wrapped within HTTP requests like in DoH. These
particularities hinder the use of traditional website fingerprint-
ing features on DoH traffic.
As a matter of fact, in our preliminary experiments, we at-
tempted to use features and techniques already used in the web
traffic fingerprinting literature [19, 21]. Most of such features
are based on aggregate metrics of traffic traces such as the total
number of packets, total bytes, and their statistics (e.g., average,
standard deviation). We found that these features are not as
relevant for DoH traffic. For instance, the accuracy of the k-
fingerprinting attack [21], which includes most website finger-
printing features considered in the literature, drops from 95%
to just 74% when applied on DoH traffic (see Table 4).
We present a novel feature set that is specifically designed for
encrypted DNS traffic. The key idea is to represent traces as n-
grams of TLS record lengths. The intuition is that n-grams cap-
ture patterns in request-response size pairs which are especially
relevant for DoH, as TLS records often contain either a request
or a response. To some extent, they also capture the local order
of the length sequence. We take tuples of n consecutive TLS
record lengths in the DoH traces trace and count the number
of their occurrences in each trace. For instance, for the trace
(−64,88,33,−33), the uni-grams are (−64), (88), (33), (−33)
and the bi-grams are (−64,88), (88,33), (33,−33). To the best of
our knowledge, n-grams had never been considered as features
in the website fingerprinting literature.
We extend the n-gram representation to traffic bursts. Bursts
are sequences of consecutive packets in the same direction (ei-
ther incoming or outgoing). Bursts correlate with the number
and order of resources embedded in the page and thus are a
good candidate feature for DoH traffic fingerprinting. Addi-
tionally, they are more robust to small changes in order than
individual sizes because they aggregate several records in the
same direction. We represent n-grams of bursts by taking tuples
burst lengths in the burst sequence. In the previous example,
the burst-length sequence of the trace above is (−64,121,−33)
and the burst bi-grams are (−64,121), (121,−33).
We experimented with uni-, bi- and tri-grams for both types
of features. We observed a marginal improvement in the clas-
sifier on using tri-grams at a substantial cost on the memory
requirements of the classifier. We also experimented with the
timing of packets but, as in website fingerprinting [51], we
found it unreliable due to its dependence on the state of the
network than on the content being served. Thus, they encode
little information about the visited website.
In our experiments we use the concatenation of uni-grams
and bi-grams of both TLS record sizes and bursts as feature
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set.
Algorithm selection. After experimenting with different su-
pervised classification algorithms, we decided to use Random
Forests (RF), which have been demonstrated to be very effec-
tive for traffic analysis tasks [21, 55].
Random forests (RF) are ensembles of simpler classifiers called
decision trees. Decision trees use a tree data structure to rep-
resent splits of the data: nodes represent a condition on one
of the data features and branches represent decisions based
on the evaluation of that condition. In decision trees, feature
importance in classification is measured with respect to how
well they split samples with respect to the target classes. The
more skewed the distribution of samples into classes is, the
better the feature discriminates. Thus, a common metric for
importance is the Shannon’s entropy of this distribution. Deci-
sion trees, however, do not generalize well and tend to overfit
the training data. RFs mitigate this issue by randomizing the
data and features over a large amount of trees, so that different
subsets of features and data are used in each tree. The final
decision of the RF is an aggregate function on the individual
decisions of its trees. In our experiments we use 100 trees and
a majority vote of the trees as the aggregate function.
Validation. We evaluate the effectiveness of our classifier mea-
suring the Precision, Recall and F1-Score (Appendix A) in two
scenarios typically used in the web traffic analysis literature.
A closed world, in which the adversary knows the set of all
possible webpages that users may visit; and an open-world, in
which the adversary only has access to a set of monitored sites,
and the user may visit webpages outside of this set.
We use 10-fold cross-validation in all of our experiments to
measure biases related to the overfitting of the classifier. Cross-
validation is a standard methodology to evaluate overfitting in
machine learning. In cross-validation, the samples of each class
are divided in ten disjoint sets. The classifier is then trained on
nine of the sets and tested in the remaining one, proving ten
samples of the classifier performance on a set of samples on
which it has not been trained on. This gives an idea of how the
classifier generalizes to unseen examples.
5.2 Evaluating n-grams features
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of our n-grams
based website fingerprinting attack on DNS traffic in the closed-
and open-world scenarios, as well as on HTTPS traffic.
Closed world We first study a closed world setting in which
the adversary knows the set of webpages visited by a user.
Table 2 shows the classifier’s performance on the LOC1 dataset.
We observe that considering the 1,414 curated webpages (see
Section 4) instead of all 1,500 webpages results in just a 1%
Table 2: Classifier performance for LOC1 dataset (mean and
standard deviation for 10-fold cross validation).
Scenario Precision Recall F1-score
Curated traces 0.914±0.002 0.909±0.002 0.908±0.002
Full dataset 0.904±0.003 0.899±0.003 0.898±0.003
Combined labels 0.940±0.003 0.935±0.003 0.934±0.003
performance increase. Thus, in the remaining experiments we
use the complete dataset.
We notice that the Alexa ranking contains URLs that refer to
regional versions of he same service. For example, google.es
and google.co.uk both point to Google, but are considered
as two separate webpages in our dataset. Even though our clas-
sifier often misclassifies these cases, from an adversary’s point
of view, they can be considered equivalent classes. The third
row in the table shows that considering classifications within
the equivalence class of a domain as a success results in a per-
formance improvement of 3-4%. See Figures 11 and 13 in the
Appendix for the confusion graphs of this evaluation.
As pointed out by prior work on website fingerprinting, av-
erage metrics can give an incomplete and biased view of the
classification results [56]. This is because the classifier’s per-
formance may vary significantly between different individual
classes. We observe that this is also the case in DoH. Figure 2
depicts individual classes in a scatterplot: each dot is a website
and its color represents the absolute difference between Preci-
sion and Recall: blue indicates 0 difference and red indicates
maximum difference (i.e., |Precision−Recall | = 1). We see
that, for some webpages the classifier obtains low Precision but
high Recall (red dots on the right of the Precision scatterplot)
and, conversely, there are pages with high Precision but low
Recall (red dots on the right of the Recall scatterplot). The
latter case is very relevant for privacy since, every time the
adversary identifies one of these pages, she is absolutely sure
her guess is correct. In censorship, for instance, this enables
the censor to block with certainty.
Adversary’s effort. To get an intuition about the data collec-
tion effort required by an adversary, we study the classifier’s
performance improvement with the number of samples used
for training . We see in Table 3 that after 20 samples there are
diminishing returns in increasing the number of samples per
domain. To minimize the data collection effort, we collected
60 samples per domain for all our datasets except for the un-
monitored websites in the open world, for which we collected
three samples per domain.
We observe a difference with respect to prior work on web
traffic analysis. Website fingerprinting studies in Tor report
more than 10% increase between 10 and 20 samples [51] and
between 2% and 10% between 100 and 200 samples [22, 57].
In DNS, we see a small increase between 10 and 20 samples,
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Figure 2: Performance per class in LOC1. Each dot represents
a class and its color the absolute difference between Precision
and Recall (blue low, red high).
Table 3: Classifier performance for different number of samples
in the LOC1 dataset averaged over 10-fold cross validation
(standard deviations less than 1%).
Number of samples Precision Recall F1-score
10 0.873 0.866 0.887
20 0.897 0.904 0.901
40 0.908 0.914 0.909
100 0.912 0.916 0.913
and a negligible difference after 20 samples.
We believe the reason why fingerprinting DoH requires fewer
samples per domain is DoH’s lower intra-class variance with
respect to encrypted web traffic. One reason for this difference
could be the presence of advertisements, which are an impor-
tant source of intra-class variance in web traffic. They often
change across visits, varying the sizes of the resources associ-
ated to the advertisement. However, the variance that advertise-
ments add to DNS traffic might be more limited. Some publish-
ers rely on ad-networks for ad mediation and, in some cases,
the ad-network’s domain and not the advertiser’s will appear
when fetching all the advertisements in the page [58].
Open world. In the previous experiments, the adversary knew
that the webpage visited by the victim was within the training
dataset. We now evaluate the adversary’s capability to distin-
guish those webpages from other unseen traffic. Following
prior work [55, 59] we consider two sets of webpages, one
monitored and one unmonitored. The adversary’s goal is to
determine whether a test trace belongs to a page within the
monitored set.
We train a classifier with monitored and unmonitored samples.
Since it is not realistic to assume that an adversary can have
access to all unmonitored classes, we create unmonitored sam-
ples using 5,000 webpages traces formed by a mix of the OW
and LOC1 datasets. We divide the classes such that 1% of all
classes are in the monitored set and 10% of all classes are used
Figure 3: Precision-Recall ROC curve for open world classifi-
cation, for the monitored class. The threshold, t, is varied from
0.0 to 0.99 in steps of 0.1 (standard deviation less than 1%).
for training. We ensure that the training dataset is balanced,
i.e., it contains equal number of monitored and unmonitored
samples; and the test set contains an equal number of samples
from classes used in training and classes unseen by the classi-
fier. To perform cross-validation, we run 10 folds. To ensure
that our classifier generalizes well to any unseen data in every
fold, we consider a different combination of the monitored and
unmonitored classes for training and testing.
To decide whether a target trace is monitored or unmonitored,
we use a method proposed by Stolerman et al. [60]. We assign
the target trace to the monitored class if and only if the classifier
predicts this class with probability larger than a threshold t,
and to unmonitored otherwise.
We show in Figure 3, the average Precision-Recall ROC curve
for the monitored class over 10 iterations varying the discrim-
ination threshold, t, from 0 to 0.99 in steps of 0.1. We also
show the random classifier, which indicates the probability
of selecting the positive class uniformly at random, and acts
as a baseline. We see that when t = 0.8, the classifier has an
F1-score of ≈ 0.7. This result suggests that traffic analysis is a
true threat to DNS privacy.
Web traffic fingerprinting. Finally, we evaluate our n-grams
features suitability for performing traditional web traffic fin-
gerprinting. We compare them to the features set in the k-
Fingerprinting attack, which includes a comprehensive set of
features used in the website fingerprinting literature [21]. For
the comparison we scaled down the closed-world, but fixed the
same number of websites and samples per website between
both feature sets. We used a random forest with the same pa-
rameters as classification algorithm in both cases.
We use the WEB dataset to evaluate the performance of the
classifiers on only DoH traffic (DoH-only), only HTTPS traf-
fic corresponding to web content traffic (Web-only), and no
filter (DoH+Web). As shown in Table 4, not only the n-grams
achieve better performance than the k-Fingerprinting features
on the DoH-only dataset but, surprisingly, they also outperform
the k-Fingerprinting features on the Web-only and DoH-Web
datasets.
In both cases, an adversary who is able to intercept all commu-
nications, both with the resolver and the web server, can im-
prove the success of the attack by adding web traffic, as shown
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Table 4: F1-Score of the n-grams and k-Fingerprinting features
for different subsets of traffic: only DoH traffic (DoH-only),
only HTTPS traffic corresponding to web traffic (Web-only)
and and the full trace (DoH+Web).
DoH-only Web-only DoH + Web
n-grams 0.87 0.99 0.88
k-Fingerprinting [21] 0.74 0.95 0.79
Table 5: F1-score when training on the interval indicated by
the row and testing on the interval in the column (standard
deviations less than 1%). We use 20 samples per webpage (the
maximum number of samples collected in all intervals).
F1-score 0 weeks old 2 weeks old 4 weeks old 6 weeks old 8 weeks old
0 weeks old 0.880 0.827 0.816 0.795 0.745
2 weeks old 0.886 0.921 0.903 0.869 0.805
4 weeks old 0.868 0.898 0.910 0.882 0.817
6 weeks old 0.775 0.796 0.815 0.876 0.844
8 weeks old 0.770 0.784 0.801 0.893 0.906
by the increase in F1-Score between the first and the last rows.
However, such an adversary is better off by discarding DoH
traffic. We hypothesize that the added variability of DoH adds
noise in small sites increasing the classifier errors.
5.3 DNS Fingerprinting Robustness
In practice, the capability of the adversary to distinguish web-
sites is very dependent on environmental characteristics and
differences in the setup while collecting data [61]. To under-
stand the impact of the environment on DNS fingerprinting
success we run experiments exploring three environmental
dimensions: time, space, and infrastructure.
5.3.1 Robustness over time
DNS traces vary due to the dynamism of webpage content and
variations in DNS responses (e.g., service IP changes because
of load-balancing). We now study how this variability impacts
the performance of the classifier.
We consider collect data LOC1 for 10 weeks between the end
of September to the beginning of November 2018. We divide
this period into five intervals, each containing two consecutive
weeks, and report in Table 5 the F1-score of the classifier when
we train the classifier on data from a single interval and use the
other intervals as test data (0 weeks old denotes data collected
in November). In most cases, the F1-score does not signifi-
cantly decrease within a period of 4 weeks. Longer periods
result in a significant drops – more than 10% drop in F1-score
when the training and testing are separated 8 weeks.
This indicates that to obtain best performance, the adversary
should collect data at least once a month. However, it is unlikely
that DNS traces change drastically. To account for gradual
changes, the adversary can perform continuous collection and
mix data across weeks. In our dataset, if we combine two-
and three-week-old samples for training; we observe a slight
decrease in performance. Thus, a continuous collection strategy
can suffice to maintain the adversary’s performance without
requiring large periodic collection efforts.
5.3.2 Robustness across locations
DNS traces may vary across locations due to several reasons.
First, DNS lookups vary when websites adapt their content to
specific geographic regions. Second, popular resources cached
by resolvers vary across regions. Finally, resolvers and CDNs
use geo-location methods for load-balancing requests, e.g.,
using anycast and EDNS [62, 63].
We collect data in three locations, two countries in Europe
(LOC1 and LOC2) and a third in Asia (LOC3). Table 6 (left-
most) shows the classifier performance when crossing these
datasets for training and testing. When trained and tested on
the same location unsurprisingly the classifier yields results
similar to the ones obtained in the base experiment. When we
train and test on different locations, the F1-score decreases
between a 16% and a 27%, the greatest drop happening for the
farthest location, LOC3, in Asia.
Interestingly, even though LOC2 yield similar F1-Scores when
cross-classified with LOC1 and LOC3, the similarity does not
hold when looking at Precision and Recall individually. For
example, training on LOC2 and testing on LOC1 results on
around 77% Precision and Recall, but training on LOC1 and
testing on LOC2 yields 84% Precision and 65% Recall. Aiming
at understanding the reasons behind this asymmetry, we build
a classifier trained to separate websites that obtain high recall
(top 25% quartile) and low recall (bottom 25% quartile) when
training with LOC1 and LOC3 and testing in LOC2. A feature
importance analysis on this classifier that LOC2’s low-recall
top features have a significantly lower importance in LOC1 and
LOC2. Furthermore, we observe that the intersection between
LOC1 and LOC3’s relevant feature sets is slightly larger than
their respective intersections with LOC2. While it is clear that
the asymmetry is caused by the configuration of the network
in LOC2, its exact cause remains an open question.
5.3.3 Robustness across infrastructure
Influence of DoH Resolver. We study two commercial DoH
resolvers, Cloudflare’s and Google’s. Contrary to Cloudflare,
Google does not provide a stand-alone DoH client. To keep the
comparison fair, we instrument a new collection setting using
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Figure 4: Top 15 most important features in Google’s and
Cloudflare’s datasets. On the left, features are sorted by the
results on Google’s dataset and, on the right, by Cloudflare’s.
Firefox in its trusted recursive resolver configuration with both
DoH resolvers.
Table 6 (center-left) shows the result of the comparison. As
expected, training and testing on the same resolver yields the
best results. In particular, we note that even though Google
hosts other services behind its resolver’s IP and thus DoH
traffic may be mixed with the visited website’s traffic (e.g., if a
web embeds Google third-party) the classifier performs equally
for both resolvers.
As in the location setting, we observe an asymmetric decrease
in one of the directions: training on GOOGLE dataset and
attacking CLOUD results in 13% F1-socre, while attacking
GOOGLE with a classifier trained on CLOUD yields similar
results as training on GOOGLE itself.
To investigate this asymmetry we rank the features according
their importance for the classifiers. For simplicity, we only
report the result on length unigrams, but we verified that our
conclusions hold when considering all features together. Fig-
ure 4 shows the top-15 most important features for a classifier
trained on Google’s resolver (left) and Cloudflare’s (right). The
rightmost diagram of each column shows the importance of
these features on the other classifier. Red tones indicate high
importance, and dark colors represent irrelevant features. Grey
indicates that the feature is not present.
We see that the most important features in Google are either
not important or missing in Cloudflare (the right column in
left-side heatmap is almost gray). As the missing features are
very important, they induce erroneous splits early in the trees,
and for a larger fraction of the data, causing the performance
drop. However, only one top feature in the classifier trained
on Cloudflare is missing in Google, and the others are also
important (right column in right-side heatmap). Google does
miss important features in Cloudflare, but they are of little im-
portance and their effect on performance is negligible.
Influence of user’s platform.
We collect traces for the 700 top Alexa webpages on a Rasp-
berry Pi (RPI dataset) and an Ubuntu desktop (DESKTOP
dataset), both from LOC1. We see in Table 6 (center-right)
that, as expected, the classifier has good performance when the
training and testing data come from the same platform. How-
ever, it drops to almost zero when crossing the datasets.
Aiming at understanding this drop, we take a closer look at
the TLS record sizes from both platforms. We found that TLS
records in the DESKTOP dataset are on average 7.8 bytes
longer than those in RPI (see Figure 10 in Appendix C). We
repeated the cross classification after adding 8 bytes to all RPI
TLS record sizes. Even though the classifiers do not reach the
base experiment’s performance, we see a significant improve-
ment in cross-classification F1-score to 0.614 when training
on DESKTOP and testing on RPI, and 0.535 when training on
RPI and testing on DESKTOP.
Influence of DNS client. Finally, we consider different client
setups: Firefox’s trusted recursive resolver or TRR (CLOUD),
Cloudlflare’s DoH client with Firefox (CL-FF) and Cloud-
flare’s DoH client with Chrome (LOC2). We collected these
datasets in location LOC2 using Cloudflare’s resolver.
Table 6 (rightmost) shows that the classifier performs as ex-
pected when trained and tested on the same client setup. When
the setup changes, the performance of the classifier drops dra-
matically, reaching zero when we use different browsers. We
hypothesize that the decrease between CL-FF and LOC2 is due
to differences in the implementation of the Firefox’s built-in
and Cloudflare’s standalone DoH clients.
Regarding the difference when changing browser, we found
that Firefox’ traces are on average 4 times longer than
Chrome’s. We looked into the unencrypted traffic to under-
stand this difference. We used a proxy to man-in-the-middle
the DoH connection between the client and the resolver4, ob-
taining the OpenSSL TLS session keys with Lekensteyn’s
scripts5. We use this proxy to decrypt DoH captures for Fire-
fox configured to use Cloudflare’s resolver, but we could not do
the same for Google. Instead, we man-in-the-middle a curl-doh
client6, which also has traces substantially shorter than Firefox.
We find that Firefox, besides resolving domains related to the
URL we visit, also issues resolutions related to OSCP servers,
captive portal detection, user’s profile/account, web extensions,
and other Mozilla servers. As a consequence, traces in CL-FF
and CLOUD datasets are substantially larger and contain con-
tain different TLS record sizes than any of our other datasets.
We conjecture that Chrome performs similar requests, but since
traces are shorter we believe the amount of checks seems to be
smaller than Firefox’s.
4https://github.com/facebookexperimental/doh-proxy
5https://git.lekensteyn.nl/peter/wireshark-notes
6https://github.com/curl/doh
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Table 6: Performance variation changes in location and infrastructure (F1-score, standard deviations less than 2%).
Location LOC1 LOC2 LOC3
LOC1 0.906 0.712 0.663
LOC2 0.748 0.908 0.646
LOC3 0.680 0.626 0.917
Resolver GOOGLE CLOUD
GOOGLE 0.880 0.129
CLOUD 0.862 0.885
Platform DESKTOP RPI
DESKTOP 0.8802 0.0003
RPI 0.0002 0.8940
Client CLOUD CL-FF LOC2
CLOUD 0.885 0.349 0.000
CL-FF 0.109 0.892 0.069
LOC2 0.001 0.062 0.908
5.3.4 Robustness Analysis Takeaways
The results in the previous section reveal that to obtain best re-
sults across different configurations the adversary would need
to train a classifier for each targeted setting. Then, of course,
she would need to be able to identify her victim’s configuration.
Kotzias et al. demonstrated that identifying client or resolver is
possible, for instance examining the IP (if the IP is dedicated to
the resolver), or fields in the ClientHello of the TLS connection
(such as the the Server Name Indication (SNI), cipher suites
ordering, etc.) [64]. Even if in the future these features are
not available, we found that the characteristics of the traffic
itself are enough to identify a resolver. We built classifiers to
distinguish resolver and client based on the TLS record length.
We can identify resolvers with 95% accuracy, and we get no
errors (100% accuracy) when identifying the client.
Regarding users’ platform, we see little difference between
desktops, laptops, and servers in Amazon Web Services. Only
when the devices are as different as a desktop and a constrained
device the classifier’s accuracy drops.
Finally, our longitudinal analysis reveals that, even though
webs change over time these changes are not drastic. Therefore,
it should not be hard for the adversary to keep up with the
changes by continuously collecting samples and incorporating
them to her training set.
Survivors and Easy Preys. We study whether there are web-
sites that are particularly good or bad at evading fingerprinting
under all the configurations evaluated in this section. We com-
pute the mean F1-Score across all configurations as an aggre-
gate measure of the attack’s overall performance, and analyze
the skew of its distribution on individual websites. We plot the
CDF of the distribution of mean F1-scores over the websites
in Figure 5. This distribution is heavily skewed: there are up
to 15% of websites that had an F1-Score equal or lower than
0.5 and more than 50% of the websites have a mean F1-Score
equal or lower than 0.7.
We looked into the tails of this distribution and ranked sites
by lowest mean F1-Score and lowest standard deviation. On
top of that ranking we have sites that survived the attack in
all configurations. Among the survivors we found Google and
errored sites that misclassify between each other. For other
surviving sites, after manual inspection we did not find a pattern
in the websites structure or the resource loads that explains
why these sites survive. We leave a more in-depth analysis of
the survival of these sites for future work. In Appendix E we
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the per-
class mean F1-Score.
list the top-10 sites in the tails of the distribution.
6 DNS Defenses against fingerprinting
In this section, we compare existing defenses aimed at prevent-
ing traffic analysis attacks on encrypted DNS traces.
EDNS(0) Padding. EDNS (Extension mechanisms for DNS)
is a specification to increase the functionality of the DNS pro-
tocol [65]. One of the options is the addition of padding [23]
by both DNS clients and resolvers in order to prevent size-
correlation attacks on encrypted DNS. The recommended
padding policy is to pad DNS requests to the nearest multiple
of 128 bytes and DNS responses to the nearest multiple of 468
bytes [66]. Cloudflare’s DoH client provides functionality to
set EDNS(0) padding to DNS queries, but leaves the specifics
of the padding policy to the user. We modify the client source
code to follow the recommended padding strategy. Google’s
specification also mentions EDNS padding. However, we could
not find any option to activate this feature.
When conducting our data collection, we discovered that Cloud-
flare’s DoH resolver does not implement server-side padding.
We communicated this fact to Cloudflare. They implemented
padding of responses in their next release. However, they fol-
lowed a strategy of padding the responses to multiples of
128 bytes, as opposed to the recommended policy of 468
bytes.
In order to also evaluate the recommended policy, we set up
an HTTPS proxy, mitmproxy, between the DoH client and
the Cloudflare resolver. The proxy intercepts responses from
Cloudflare’s DoH resolver, strips the existing padding, and
pads responses to the nearest multiple of 468 bytes.
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Below, we evaluate the effectiveness against traffic analysis of
padding both queries and responses, using Cloudflare’s imple-
mentation of response padding (EDNS0-128) and the recom-
mended response padding (EDNS0-468).
Constant padding. To fully understand the potential of padding,
we also simulate a setting in which all packets are padded to
the same length (that of the longest packet in the dataset, with
a size of 825 bytes). This implies that the classifier cannot
exploit the TLS record size information.
DNS over Tor. We finally evaluate the use of Tor as a deterrent
for traffic analysis attack. We use Cloudflare’s DNS over Tor
service as a target.
Results. Table 7 shows the classification results for all de-
fenses. EDNS0 padding of both queries and responses, which
was intended to alleviate traffic analysis attacks, is not as ef-
fective as expected.
Padding both requests and responses, which was intended to
alleviate traffic analysis attacks, is not as effective as expected.
Using a response padding strategy of padding to a multiple
of 128 bytes, while reducing the F1-score, is not as effective
as the recommended strategy of padding to a multiple of 468
bytes. Padding all record sizes to the same size value greatly
reduces the F1-score. However, it is not as effective as using
Tor, probably because some order information of the records
is still maintained, even if the size information is no longer
available to the classifier.
The success of Tor for DNS encrypted traffic is a huge differ-
ence with respect to web traffic, where website fingerprinting
obtains remarkable performance [21, 22, 50]. The reason is
that DNS lookups and responses are fairly small, they result in
mostly one or two Tor cells which in turn materialize in few
observed TLS record sizes, making it difficult to find features
unique to a page. We see a similar effect in the number of TLS
records per trace – TOR traces are generally shorter and have
less variance. Thus lengths-related features, which have been
proven to be very important in website fingerprinting, are of
no help in the DNS scenario. They only provide a weak 1%
performance improvement. Web traffic contains much bigger
resources and as a result TLS traces present more variability
and are easier to fingerprint. much more information.
While DNS over Tor obtains the best results, when we look
closely at the misclassified webpages, we find that webpages
get misclassified within six clusters (see Figure 12 in the Ap-
pendix). We train a classifier considering all domains within a
cluster as equivalent classes. This classifier achieves ≈55% ac-
curacy, compared to 16% accuracy for random guessing. This
means that despite Tor’s protection the effective anonymity set
for a webpage is much smaller than the total number of web-
pages in the dataset. We leave as future work a comprehensive
analysis of what traffic characteristics contribute towards the
Table 7: Classification results for countermeasures.
Method Precision Recall F1-score
EDNS0-128 0.710±0.005 0.700±0.004 0.691±0.004
EDNS0-468 0.452±0.007 0.448±0.006 0.430±0.007
Constant Padding 0.070±0.003 0.080±0.002 0.066±0.002
DNS over Tor 0.035±0.004 0.037±0.003 0.033±0.003
Figure 6: Total volume of traffic with and without countermea-
sures.
formation of these clusters.
Finally, we evaluate the trade-off between the defenses’ effec-
tiveness and their communication overhead. To compute the
overhead generated by each countermeasure, we collect 10 sam-
ples of 50 webpages with and without countermeasures.
Figure 6 shows the total volume distribution (sent and received
data) for all cases. As expected, the EDNS0 padding (both 128
and 468) add the least overhead, but they also offer the least
protection. DNS over Tor, in addition to being more effective
than constant padding, also has a smaller overhead. We con-
clude that DNS repacketizing in addition to padding, as done
in Tor, can be a promising avenue to explore.
7 DNS Encryption and Censorship
DNS-based blocking is a wide-spread method of censoring
access to web content. Censors inspect DNS lookups and when
they detect a blacklisted domain, they either reset the connec-
tion or inject their own DNS response [67]. DoH encrypts DNS
by default, rendering content-based DNS blocking ineffective.
If censors want to continue restricting access to content by
blocking DNS, DoH forces them to block the resolver’s IP.
While this would be very effective, some DoH resolvers, such
as Google’s, do not necessarily have a dedicated IP. Thus,
blocking their IP causes collateral damage that may be too
expensive for the censor.
In this section, we study whether DoH traffic is really an effec-
tive countermeasure to deter DNS-based censorship. A censor
aims at blocking access to a number of blacklisted domains.
To achieve this goal, the censor needs to identify the domain
as soon as possible to prevent the user from downloading any
content. We aim at answering two questions: how long must
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Figure 7: Conditional entropy H(W | Sl) given partial obser-
vations of DoH traces for 10, 100, 500 and 1,500 webpages.
Each data point is averaged over 10 samples.
the adversary observe the connection to uniquely identify the
domain? Second, based on the answer to the first question,
what strategy allows the censor to maximize censoring rates
while minimizing collateral damage?
7.1 Uniqueness of DoH traces
In order for the censor to be able to uniquely identify domains
given DoH traffic, the DoH traces need to be unique. In particu-
lar, to fulfill the censor’s goal the first packets of the trace need
to be unique. In the the following, we study the uniqueness of
DoH traffic when only the l first TLS records (or packets, for
short) have been observed.
Let us model the set of webpages in the world as a random vari-
able W with sample space ΩW ; and the set of possible network
traces generated by those websites as a random variable S with
sample space ΩS . A website’s trace w is a sequence of non-
zero integers: (si)ni=1, si ∈ Zr {0}, n ∈ N, where si represents
the size (in bytes) of the i-th TLS record in the traffic trace and
its sign represents the direction – negative for incoming (DNS
to client) and positive otherwise.
We measure uniqueness using the conditional entropy H(W |
Sl), defined as: H(W | Sl) =
∑
∀o∈ΩSl
Pr[Sl = o]H(W | Sl = o),
where H(W | Sl = o) is the Shannon entropy of the probability
distribution Pr[W | Sl = o] describing the likelihood that the
adversary guesses websites in W given the observation o. This
entropy measures distinguishability of traces up to packet l.
For instance, if every DoH trace started with a packet of a
different size, then the entropy H(W | S1) would be 0, i.e., sites
would be perfectly distinct from the first packet.
We show in Figure 7 the conditional entropy H(W | Sl) for
different number of webpages n in the LOC1 dataset. Every
point is an average over 10 samples of n webs from the dataset
selected uniformly at random with replacement. The shades
represent the standard deviation across the 10 samples.
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Figure 8: Histograms for domain name length (top) and fourth
TLS record length (bottom) in the LOC1 dataset (normalized
over the total sum of counts).
First, we observe that the conditional entropy decreases as the
adversary observes more packets. For all cases, we observe a
drop of up to 4 bits within the first four packets, and a drop
below 0.1 bits after 20 packets (reaching zero when n = 10,100
sites). We note that as we consider more websites, the like-
lihood of having two or more websites with identical traces
increases. Thus, we observe a slower decay in entropy.
A second observation is that the standard deviation is lower
for small and large l’s. The former is because the first packets
correspond to the connection establishment. Thus, they are
similar for all webpages. The latter is because as l increases,
the traces become more dissimilar and thus the entropy is close
to zero regardless of which websites are sampled. We also
observe larger variation when few websites are considered.
This is because we only have 1,500 webs. As the number of
websites per group increases, there is more overlap among the
groups used in the experiment. For 1,500 there is no variance
because all samples contain the full dataset.
When considering all 1,500 pages, the conditional entropy
drops below 1 bit after 15 packets. This means that after 15
packets have been observed, there is one domain whose prob-
ability of having generated the trace is larger than 0.5. The
average trace length in our dataset is 96 packets. Thus, 15
packets is just 15% of the whole trace. This means that, on av-
erage, the adversary only needs to observe the initial 15% of a
DoH connection to determine a domain with more confidence
than taking a random guess between two domains.
Next, we investigate the cause behind the consistent entropy
decrease within the first four TLS records. We hypothesized
that it might be caused by the fact that one of these records
contains the DoH query. Since the DoH protocol does not
specify padding, uniqueness in the domain length would be
directly observable in the trace. To verify our hypothesis we
plot the frequency of the domain’s and fourth record’s length in
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Figure 8. We discarded TLS incoming packets – as they cannot
contain a DoH query–, and TLS record sizes corresponding to
HTTP2 control messages, e.g., the size “33” which corresponds
to HTTP2 acknowledgements. We also removed outliers for
sizes that occurred 5% or less times. We kept any size that
could have contained a DoH query. For instance, we kept size
“88” even though it appears too often to only be caused by
DoH queries, as such packet size could be caused by queries
containing 37-characters-long domain names.
The histogram of the sizes of the fourth TLS record in our
dataset is almost identical to the histogram of domain name
lengths. This confirms our hypothesis that the fourth packet
often contains the first-party DoH query. We verified that the
constant difference of 51 bytes between the two histograms is
the size of the HTTPS header. We also observed that in some
traces the DoH query is sent earlier, explaining the entropy
decrease starting after the second packet.
7.2 Censor DNS-blocking strategy
Given that traces are not completely unique, the censor must act
on guesses. When wrong, these guesses will cause collateral
damage. Of course, the adversary can increase her confidence
in her guesses by waiting to observe more TLS records. Thus,
there is a trade-off between the collateral damage caused by
erred guesses and the amount of content that can be accessed
by users. We now discuss advantages and disadvantages of two
strategies to censor a connection based solely on encrypted
DNS traffic. We assume that upon decision, the censor uses
standard techniques to block the connection [68].
High-confidence guesses. A possible strategy to minimize the
likelihood of collateral damage is to act only upon seeing the
entropy going lower than one bit. Following this strategy, the
adversary would not block, on average, 15% of the TLS records
in the DoH connection. Those packets include the resolution to
the first-party domain. Thus, the client can download the con-
tent served from this domain. Yet, the censor can still disrupt
access to subsequent queried domains (subdomains and third-
parties). We note that quality degradation is a strategy already
used in the wild as a stealthy form of censorship [68].
As a response to this censorship strategy, the client could just
create a new connection for each DoH query so that the censor
cannot distinguish DoH connections belonging to the censored
webpage visit or to others. At the cost of generating more traffic
for users and resolvers, this would force the censor to drop all
DoH connections originating from a user’s IP or throttle their
DoH traffic, causing more collateral damage.
Block on first DoH query. An alternative strategy is to drop
the DoH connection before the first DoH response arrives. This
guarantees that the client cannot access any content, not even
index.html. However, it implies that all domains that result
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Figure 9: Conditional entropy over the number of observed
packets for pairs of sites. The black bold vertical line corre-
sponds to the median position of the first incoming packet,
likely to contain the first DoH response.
on the same trace up to the first DoH query, i.e., all domains
with same name length, would also be censored. We illustrate
this effect in Figure 9, where we show the entropy decrease for
different pairs of sites. We see that sites with different lengths
(facebook.com and nytimes.com) are distinguishable on the
fourth packet. However, when domains have the same name
length the entropy only drops after the the DoH response, which
is different per domain, and hence distinguishable. We note
that, even for cases when the same service has different domain
names with equal length (e.g., google.es and google.be) the
entropy eventually drops to zero. For these cases instead of
waiting, the adversary can also combine all equivalent pages
in the same class, which as shown in Section 5.2 increases the
performance of the classifier.
Finally, we quantify the collateral damage incurred when block-
ing the first DoH query. The histogram in Figure 8 (top) repre-
sents the anonymity sets of websites with same domain name
length. For instance, when blocking nytimes.com, that has
length 11, one would also block other 111 websites. In our
data, anonymity set sizes are unevenly distributed. Only two
websites have anonymity set one, and thus can be blocked with
no collateral damage.
We also observe that popular domains (according to the Alexa
rank on the March 26) tend to have more common domain
name lengths. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the
domain name length and its Alexa rank for the top 1,000 do-
mains is 0.49, which indicates a moderate-to-high correlation.
In particular, the first top-five domains all lie in the 9-13 name
length range, the most popular lengths. This is because these
lengths correspond to the average length of a word in English
and are the easiest to remember. Also, less popular domains
often have a second- or third-level domain name such as tumblr
or Wordpress sites.
Internet traffic volume distribution over domains follows a
power-law [69], i.e., the Alexa top domains accumulate a large
fraction of the overall internet traffic. Thus, blocking those do-
mains not only has large collateral damage in terms of number
of webs, but also traffic volume. On the contrary, blacklisting
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unpopular domains with uncommon lengths (in our dataset
shorter than 8 or longer than 20 characters), not only blocks
less websites, but also affect less overall traffic. The correla-
tion between name length and popularity deserves a deeper
study, since we show it is advantageous for some types of
censors that tackle non-popular domains such as sites trading
drugs.
8 Conclusions
We have performed the first evaluation of DNS-over-HTTPS
vulnerability to traffic analysis. We have proposed a new set of
features that characterize local patterns in traces. We show that
these features are also suitable for web traffic fingerprinting,
obtaining results comparable to the state of the art classifiers
on HTTPS.
Our experiments show that, encryption is not sufficient to pro-
tect users from surveillance or DNS-based censorship. We also
demonstrated that changes in factors such as end-user location,
local DNS resolver, or client’s platform negatively impact the
attack performance, but in many cases traffic analysis is still
pretty effective. Furthermore, it is easy for the adversary to
recognize the setting of her target and select the most adequate
classifier.
In terms of defenses, we show that the recommended EDNS0
padding strategies do not hinder traffic analysis. Repacketiz-
ing and padding, as done in anonymous communications, is
required to defeat traffic analysis.
We hope that these results serve to influence the evolution
of standards on DNS privacy, and prompt main providers to
prioritize the addition of countermeasures in their next releases.
This seems nowadays out of their plans [70, 71] even though
they claim to strive for providing privacy.
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A Performance metrics.
We use standard metrics to evaluate the performance of our
classifier: Precision, Recall and F1-Score. We compute these
metrics per class, where each class represents a webpage. We
compute these metrics on a class as if it was a “one vs. all”
binary classification: we call “positives” the samples that be-
long to that class and “negatives” the samples that belong to
the rest of classes. Precision is the ratio of true positives to the
total number of samples that were classified as positive (true
positives and false positives). Recall is the ratio of true posi-
tives to the total number of positives (true positives and false
negatives). The F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision
and recall.
B Estimation of Probabilities
In this section we explain how we have estiamted the proba-
bilities for for the entropy analysis in Sections 5 and 7.
We define the anonymity set of a trace s as a multiset:
A(s) := {wms (w)},
where ms(w) is the multiplicity of a website w in A(s). The
multiplicity is a function defined as the number of times that
trace s occurrs in w.
The probability Pr[W = w | Sl = o] can be worked out using
Bayes. For instance, for website w,
Pr[W = w | Sl = o] = Pr[W = w]Pr[Sl = o |W = w]m∑
i=1
Pr[W = wi]Pr[Sl = o |W = wi]
(1)
We assume the distribution of priors is uniform, i.e., the prob-
ability of observing a website is the same for all websites:
Pr[wi] = Pr[wj] ∀i, j.
We acknowledge that this is an unrealisitc assumption but we
provide the mathematical model to incorporate the priors in
case future work has the data to estimate them.
Assuming uniform priors allows us to simplify the Bayes
rule formula since we can factor out Pr[W = wi] in Equa-
tion 1
Regarding the likelihoods of observing the traces given a web-
site, we can use the traffic trace samples in our dataset as
observations to estimate them:
Pr[Sl = o |W = wi] ≈ ms(wi)ki
Since we have a large number of samples for all the sites, we
can fix the same sample size for all sites: ki = k j ∀i, j. A fixed
sample size allows us to factor out ki in our likelihood estimates
and, thus, the posterior can be estimated simply as:
Pr[W = w | Sl = o] ≈ ms(w)m∑
i=1
ms(wi)
=
ms(w)
|A(s)|
.
That is the multiplicity of website w divided by the size of the
s’s anonymity set, which can be computed efficiently for all w
and s using vectorial operations.
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C Extra results on attack robustness
Table 8: Performance when training on the resolver indicated
by the row and testing on the resolver indicated by the column
(standard deviations less than 1%).
Precision GOOGLE CLOUD
GOOGLE 0.886 0.386
CLOUD 0.881 0.890
Recall GOOGLE CLOUD
GOOGLE 0.881 0.083
CLOUD 0.860 0.886
Table 9: Performance when training on the platform indicated
by the row and testing on the platform indicated in the column
(standard deviation less than 1% for same platform and less
than 0.1% for cross-platform.
Precision DESKTOP RPI
DESKTOP 0.8848 0.0003
RPI 0.0003 0.8970
Recall DESKTOP RPI
DESKTOP 0.8816 0.0008
RPI 0.0010 0.8945
Figure 10: Distribution of user’s sent TLS record sizes in plat-
form experiment.
D Confusion Graphs
We have used confusion graphs to understand the errors of
the classifier. Confusion graphs are the graph representation
of confusion matrices. They allow to easily visualize large
confusion matrices by representing misclassifications as di-
rected graphs. Confusion graphs have been used in website
fingerprinting [56] and other classification tasks to understand
classifier error [72].
Figures 11, 12 and 13 show the classification errors in the form
of confusion graphs for some of the experiments presented in
Section 5. The graphs were drawn using Gephi, a software
for graph manipulation and visualization. Nodes in the graph
are domains and edges represent misclassifications between
domains. The edge source is the true label of the sample and
the destination is the domain that the classifier confused it with.
The direction of the edge is encoded clockwise in the curvature
of the edge. Node size is proportional to the node’s degree and
nodes are colored according to the community they belong
to, which is determined by the Lovain community detection
algorithm [73].
Table 10: Improvement in cross platform performance when
removing the shift (standard deviation less than 1%).
Train Test Precision Recall F-score
DESKTOP RPI 0.630 0.654 0.614
RPI DESKTOP 0.552 0.574 0.535
Table 11: Performance when training on the client setups indi-
cated by the row and testing on the configuration indicated by
the column (standard deviations less than 2%).
Precision CLOUD CL-FF LOC2
CLOUD 0.890 0.646 0.000
CL-FF 0.257 0.896 0.089
LOC2 0.001 0.090 0.911
Recall CLOUD CL-FF LOC2
CLOUD 0.886 0.267 0.001
CL-FF 0.080 0.893 0.073
LOC2 0.004 0.069 0.909
mesopelagic.tumblr.com
mr-kyles-sluts.tumblr.com
bbc.co.uk
bbc.com
mrsnatasharomanov.tumblr.com
pensandplanners.tumblr.com
headwaydigital.com
spotify.com
millertrailersales.net
midcoastconnector.org
injuredcandy.com
google.com
ksanner.tumblr.com
matzapiski.si
mega.nz
salesforce.com
force.com
peterbodnar-onlinemixing.com
planinsko-drustvo-cerkno.si
indoorvinylfloor.org
mozilla.org
reddit.com
theepochtimes.com
discogs.com
baidu.com
morningbabe2018.tumblr.com
samsung.com
millsriver.org
Figure 11: Confusion graph for the misclassifications in LOC1
that happen in more than one fold of the cross-validation and
have different domain name length. We observe domains that
belong to the same CDN (e.g., tumblr) or belong to the same
entity (e.g., BBC, Salesforce). For others, however, the cause
of the misclassification remains an open question.
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Figure 12: Confusion graph for all Tor misclassifications. We
did not plot the labels to remove clutter. We observe that do-
mains in one a “petal” of the graph tend to classify between
each other.
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E Survivors and Easy Preys
Table 12: Top-10 with highest-mean and lowest-variance F1-Score
Alexa Rank Mean F1-Score Stdev F1-Score Domain name
777 0.95 0.08 militaryfamilygiftmarket.com
985 0.95 0.08 myffpc.com
874 0.95 0.08 montrealhealthygirl.com
712 0.95 0.08 mersea.restaurant
1496 0.95 0.08 samantha-wilson.com
1325 0.95 0.08 nadskofija-ljubljana.si
736 0.95 0.08 michaelnewnham.com
852 0.95 0.08 mollysatthemarket.net
758 0.95 0.08 midwestdiesel.com
1469 0.95 0.08 reclaimedbricktiles.blogspot.si
Table 13: Top-10 sites with lowest-mean and lowest-variance F1-Score
Alexa Rank Mean F1-Score Stdev F1-Score Domain name
822 0.11 0.10 mjtraders.com
1464 0.11 0.08 ravenfamily.org
853 0.14 0.09 moloneyhousedoolin.ie
978 0.14 0.17 mydeliverydoctor.com
999 0.17 0.10 myofascialrelease.com
826 0.17 0.11 mm-bbs.org
1128 0.17 0.10 inetgiant.com
889 0.18 0.14 motorize.com
791 0.18 0.15 mindshatter.com
1193 0.20 0.14 knjiznica-velenje.si
Table 14: Top-10 sites with highest-variance F1-Score
Alexa Rank Mean F1-Score Stdev F1-Score Domain name
1136 0.43 0.53 intothemysticseasons.tumblr.com
782 0.43 0.53 milliesdiner.com
766 0.43 0.53 mikaelson-imagines.tumblr.com
1151 0.43 0.53 japanese-porn-guidecom.tumblr.com
891 0.42 0.52 motorstylegarage.tumblr.com
909 0.42 0.52 mr-kyles-sluts.tumblr.com
918 0.44 0.52 mrsnatasharomanov.tumblr.com
1267 0.52 0.49 meander-the-world.com
238 0.48 0.49 caijing.com.cn
186 0.48 0.48 etsy.com
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Figure 13: Confusion graph for all misclassifications in LOC1. We observe clusters of domains such as Google and clusters of
domains that have the same name length. Interestingly, the only inter-cluster edge we observe is between one of the Google
clusters and a cluster that mostly contains Chinese domains.
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